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CHAPAPOTE: INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE
LIBERALIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN MEXICO
I. INTRODUCTION
Aztecs burned what they called chapopote for tribute to the gods. ' They
smeared the dark, viscous substance on their skin, believing it contained
healing properties and also used it for the "practical" purposes of dye and
glue.2 Chapopote, extracted from the earth prior to the 1519 Spanish
conquest, was uniquely tied to the native peoples' worship and livelihood.
In the late 19th Century, after both domestic and foreign exploration,
chapopote or petr6leos became a profit-making commodity. But the profits
increasingly ran to foreigners, to whom the Mexican government granted
generous extraction rights. In a highly symbolic move, President Ldzaro
Cirdenas (1934-1940) expropriated oil fields on March 18, 1938, claiming
that foreign capitalists thwarted the sovereignty of the nation.3 Cirdenas'
action further supported Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution,
declaring the nation to be the original owner of all lands and minerals,
including "petroleum and all hydrocarbons, solid, liquid or gaseous. " 4 By
1940, Cirdenas consolidated all exploration, exploitation, refining and
marketing of petroleum into a single state-operated enterprise: Petr6leos
Mexicanos or PEMEX. s
Like the Aztecs four centuries earlier, oil represents much more to the
Mexican people than a commodity for its "practical" purposes. It carries
healing qualities, representing a restoration of natural resources to Mexico.
Oil is symbolically linked to the Mexican Revolution, representing Mexico's
sovereignty in standing up to the largest and most powerful international
corporations in the world.'
In Mexico's internal politics, oil is an important commodity for labor.7
The expropriation began as a labor dispute8 , and the Oil Worker's Union has
emerged as a key element in the PRI's corporatist structure of government.
1. GEORGE W. GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL 3 (1980).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 15.
4. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 27, para. 4(Mdxico).
5. Christopher C. Joyner, Petr6leos Mexicanos In A Developing Society: The Political
Economy of MOxico's National Oil Industry, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 63, 69
(1982).
6. Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum
Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 13, 30 (1989).
7. See infra Section IB.
8. See infra Section IA.
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Fifty-four years after expropriation, at PEMEX's anniversary, current
Mexican President Carlos Salinas remained adamant that "the property of oil
stays uniquely and firmly under control of the Mexican state. "9 His political
rhetoric courts the nationalism that oil belongs to Mexicans and that PEMEX
is best suited to preserve the resource for the people. In excluding oil from
free trade negotiations, Salinas said, "Our Constitution will not adjust itself
to the free trade agreement. The oil industry will continue to be the
exclusive patrimony of Mexicans." One official commented that PEMEX
is
like the Church . . . the political realities are such that you can't think
about change there. It may not make economic sense. It's a matter of
public opinion, and it is immutable."
But Mexico is not solely shaped by nationalist impulses, for it is also
effected by its relationship with other countries in a global economy. Since
World War II, the world has become more interdependent 2 as countries are
reliant on each other for international trade, communications and transporta-
tion. Internal economic choices do not operate in a domestic vacuum, but
are sensitive to global concerns of international competition. Thus,
interdependence has led to changes in oil policy, the symbol for Mexican
nationality.
Despite the pervasive nationalism associated with the state-controlled oil,
PEMEX is loosening its stubborn hold over all aspects of the petroleum
industry. 3 Though drilling is controlled by PEMEX, new opportunities
exist for participation in production, including joint ventures for refinery and
foreign investment in "secondary petrochemicals." 4 New proposals suggest
that Mexico might allow even further privatization of its oil industry.
This comment addresses the tension in Mexican oil policy between
internal political forces and the external compulsion to compete in a global
economy. 5 Part 2 discusses oil's socio-political significance in Mexican
9. Damine Fraser, Mexico Faces Hard Choice in Keeping Oil Out of NAFTA, FINANCIAL
TIMEs, June 11, 1992, at 3.
10. Oil's Role in Free Trade Agreement Crux of Mexico's Petroleum Sector Dilemma, OIL
& GAS JOURNAL, Feb. 3, 1992, at 16 (emphasis added).
11. Tim Golden, One of Mexico's Proud Symbols Slowly Bows to Change, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 1992, at 4-5.
12. For discussion on interdependence see infra note 122 and 123 and accompanying text.
13. For discussion see infra Section IIIC.
14. Secondary petrochemicals are those chemicals determined by the Mexican government
to not be "primary." See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
15. Mexico's economy can be characterized, in the words of Thomas M. Callaghy, as
.embedded liberalism," The political economy of states as a compromise between state-society
relations and pristine liberalism. Callaghy calls this compromise "embedded liberalism":
political elites use state power simultaneously with liberalism in the interest of both domestic
social stability and international economic adjustment. The state pursues international economic
liberalism, but it is compromised by being "embedded" in the political and economic realities
of state-society relations that are difficult to challenge. The developing world, argues Callaghy,
[Vol. 24
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society as (1) symbolic of sovereignty, (2) symbolic of the alliance between
the PRI and labor and (3) a cornerstone for the PRI economic development
strategy. Part 3 analyzes the ramifications of the interdependent relationship
between the United States and Mexico on the PRI's economic development
strategy and the oil industry. Part 4 examines the North American Free
Trade Agreement as a regime to manage the interdependent relationship
between Mexico and the United States and its effect on Mexican oil. Part 5
concludes that policies of increased foreign investment in Mexico's oil
contributes to political liberalization and the decay of support for the
authoritarian governing party.
II. OIL'S SOCIO-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN MEXICO
Oil is symbolically important for the ruling Partido Revolutionario
Institucional (PRI), the party that institutionalized the Revolution's ideals and
social participants now entrenched in the political system.'6 President
Lzaro Cirdenas expropriated oil in 1938 from foreign control, making oil
a national symbol of Mexico's sovereignty. 7 Oil also represents support
of the ruling party for labor interests.'" In expropriation, the revolutionary
party, the PRI, co opted labor interests into its ruling coalition. Political
elites then used oil to help finance economic development, prioritizing the
domestic economy with protectionism."
A. Oil as a Symbol of Nationalism
Oil's importance as a national symbol began prior to the 1910 revolution
when popular sentiment rejected policies that allowed outright foreign
has difficulty pursuing policies of economic liberalism because the states are not insulated from
threatening political and societal pressure. See Thomas M. Callaghy, Toward State Capability
and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for Adjustment, in FRAGILE COALITIONS:
THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 115 (John M. Nelson, ed., 1989). For specific
application to Mexico, see 123.
16. A revolution occurs when societal values, or shared explanations of a social situation
and the standards of appropriate action to manage the situation, are in disequilibrium with the
reality of a society's division of labor. For a further explanation see CHALMERS JOHNSON,
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE (2d ed. 1982). Thus, a revolution involves (1) societal change of
constitutional principles, or who legitimately can exercise authority within society, and (2)
distributive justice, or who gets scarce resources and how they are distributed. The PRI
institutionalized the Revolution, determining the legitimate exercise of authority and matters of
distributive justice. Political authority would be vested in a strong executive who could act
against foreign influence and labor would be a chief beneficiary of societal goods.
17. See infra note 48 and corresponding text.
18. The party controls Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Repfiblica Mexicana
[STPRM, or the Union of Oil Workers of the Mexican Republic, and has acted as the defender
of labor interests. See Section i3B.
19. See infra Section IIC.
1993]
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ownership of petroleum.2' President Porfirio Diaz created a climate for
foreign exploitation as a part of his conviction that Mexican social advance-
ment would come through industrial modernization. 21  The Dfaz regime
granted generous concessions to the oil companies, believing that the
resulting modernization would benefit Mexico.'
Allowing concessions, Dfaz (1876-1880, 1884-1911) altered Spanish
legal principle of land and mineral rights. At least dating to 1387, the
traditional mining code declared that title to mineral substances, including
petroleum, was in the sovereign, who granted rights and governed the
working of the mines as desired.' Diaz's change in the 1884 Mining Law
provided that petroleum and natural gas were the "exclusive property of the
owner of the soil."' The 1892 Mining Law stated that ownership of
20. The era from the first oil well in Mexico in 1876 to the revolution was marked by
increasing anti-Americanism and economic nationalism. Anti-Americanism originally stemmed
from the invasion of the U.S. into Mexican territory in 1846, when the U.S. campaign of
"Manifest Destiny" expanded over half of Mexico. The exploitation of Mexico's oil and the
willingness of great powers to support their industry at the expense of Mexican sovereignty
fanned the flame of resentment toward the northern power. These attitudes culminated
"economic nationalism" and finally in expropriation of oil in 1938. See RICHARD MANCrE,
MEXICAN OIL AND NATURAL GAS 18 (1979).
21. Id. at 19. Diaz surrounded himself with cientificos, who encouraged foreign investment
as a means to better the Mexico's economic position. As a result of financial reforms, Mexico
maintained impressive industrial and commercial growth. In 1895, the federal government
produced a budget surplus and Diaz managed to balance the budget thereafter. See THOMAS E.
KIDMORE & PETER SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 223 (2d ed. 1989).
22. An example is in 1885, when Waterson Pierce Co., an affiliate of Standard Oil of the
U.S., secured a importing concession from Diaz. Pierce would import crude from Pennsylvania,
taking advantage of low import duties, and refine and sell the kerosene in the Mexican market.
The company secured a monopoly on the kerosene market. Mr. Pierce then acquired a
controlling interest in the Mexican Central Railroad, and used his influence to acquire a sure
supply of oil for Standard Oil in New England. Specifically, he hired Edward Doheny to
prospect for Mexican oil near the railroad's right-of-way. Pierce promised to use the oil for
fuel. When oil was struck, the railroad did not use the oil, but Standard oil agreed to purchase
the oil and Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company maintained supplied 20 million barrels in
1921 to New England. See MANCKE, supra note 20, at 22-25.
23. MANCKE, supra note 20, at 42. Charles III of Spain codified the law for Nueva-Espafia
in 1783. It read :
Mines are the property of my royal crown, both by their nature and their origin...
without separating them from my royal patrimony I grant them to my subjects...
upon two conditions, that they shall contribute to my Royal Treasury the prescribed
portion of metals; and second, that they shall work ... the mines complying with
what is prescribed . . . whenever a failure shall occur in complying with those
ordinances . . . they may be granted to any person who for that cause may
denonounce them.
(Bitumens or juices of the earth were included in the definition of minerals.) Id.
24. To protect the investment of foreigners, Diaz first amended the Constitution, bringing
mining matters into national jurisdiction. The mining code of 1885 read :
Article 6. Foreigners may acquire mining property on such terms and with such
limitations as the law of the republic granted them the capacity to acquire, own and
transfer ordinary property . . .
Article 10. The following substances are the exclusive property of the owner of the
land, who may therefore develop and enjoy them, without the formality of entry or
4
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mining property "shall be irrevocable and perpetual," and oil and gas could
be exploited without first obtaining a concession agreement.2 In 1909,
another Mining Law declared that "deposits of mineral fuels, of whatever
form or variety were the exclusive property of the owner of the soil." 26 Oil
companies interpreted these laws as granting them common law fee simple
absolute in the surface as well as subsurface rights.27 Thus, companies
purchased Mexican land outright in order to gain ownership of the petro-
leum.' By the Mexican Revolution, much of the subsoil was claimed by
foreign companies.29 In 1910, only 834 Mexican men shared one-fourth of
Mexican land.30
The revolution that began in 19103 was largely a reaction to the Diaz
policies that may have spurred impressive economic growth32, but benefitted
only a few Mexican elite and many foreigners .3 Common threads seemed
to run through the civil war that ensued between 1910 and 1917: land and
special adjudication.
Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6, at 13. See MANCKE, supra note 17, at 43.
25. Id. The 1892 Mining Law read:
Article 4. The owner of the land may freely work, without a special franchise in any
case whatsoever, the following mineral substances : mineral fuels, oils and mineral
waters.
Article 5. All mining property legally acquired and such as hereafter may be
acquired in pursuance of this law shall be irrevocable and perpetual, so long as the




27. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6 at 28-29.
28. For example, one extractor, Edward Doheny purchased 450,000 acres of land
surrounding an area he discovered oil. See MANCKE, supra note 20, at 23.
29. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6, at 28.
30. MANCKE, supra note 20, at 27.
31. The call for revolution came in 1910, when Francisco Madero campaigned against Diaz
in the general election. When Diaz won the election, Madero called for armed resistance. In
weakness, Diaz resigned and left the country in May, 1911. Id.
32. Examples of economic growth included railroads. In four years, track grew from 750
miles to 3600 in the 1880's. Foreign trade increased dramatically. The U.S. became the largest
trading partner. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 21, at 223.
33. The economic progress had its cost. Concessions came from the state while needed
investment came from abroad. The result was that (1) the wealthy prospered but the masses
remained in poverty and (2) Mexico never developed an entrepreneurial class. They remained
dependent on foreign countries for their growth. Mexico suffered from a labor surplus and
wages remained low as a consequence. Skidmore and Smith describe the situation as follows:
In 1990, 29% of all male children died in the first year of life, labor hours were 12 hours a day
in sweatshops, and three-fourths of the population was illiterate. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra
note 21, at 224.
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labor.34 Supporting agrarian and labor interests meant eradicating foreign
control over industry and land. Thus, the revolutionary process had a
necessary anti-American bent.35
In institutionalizing the revolution, Venustiano Carranza's government
produced a new Mexican Constitution in 1917 which supported agrarian
reform and labor interests.36 Part of land reform revoked Dfaz's legislation
and returned minerals to state ownership. 37 Article 27 of the 1917 Constitu-
tion vests in the nation direct ownership of all natural resources, solid, liquid
or gaseous hydrocarbon, whose character is distinct from the components of
the soil.
38
The Mexican Constitution, Article 27 places "direct dominion" over
"petroleum and all solid, liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons" with the state.
Further, no "concessions or contracts" are to be granted, and the "Nation
will carry out the exploitation" of those hydrocarbons. A narrow reading of
34. Land reform remained the main issue through the following years of turmoil.
Zapatistas, led by Emiliano Zapata, sought to regain the land usurped by foreign interests.
Joined with the landless peasants, they mounted resistance against the government.
Another challenger, Venustiano Carranza attached to labor in his accession to power. He
agreed with labor leaders to institute favorable labor laws in return for backing. Labor
continually disputed the difference in wages between U.S. employees and Mexican employees
at the same plants under the Diaz regime.
For a concise description of the Revolution see SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 21, at 224-
33.
35. Continued U.S. involvement throughout the turmoil only increased sentiments of anti-
Americanism. Evidence suggests that Standard Oil had a part in overthrowing Dfaz. Diaz
increasingly supported concessions to British oil companies in order to prevent U.S. domination.
Standard, desiring more concessions, had incentive to overthrow the Diaz regime and replace
it with one more amenable to their interests. The U.S. Justice Department threatened
investigation. A Senate investigating committee also investigated, but disbanded prior to issuing
a report. Curiously, during 1911-12, Texaco, Gulf and Standard Oil were able to invest more
in Mexico. Standard Oil purchased 400 acres of land in Tampico.
Madero's attempt to tax oil .$03 per barrel, sparked enormous criticism from U.S. oil
interests. The U.S. issued an ultimatum, claiming that the tax, which applied non-discriminately
to all oil producers, was discriminatory and taxed the oil companies "beyond endurance."
Circumstantial evidence exists that the U.S. ambassador was involved in Madero's overthrow
and death on February 18, 1913.
Oil interests supported the next regime led by General Huerta, who granted generous
concessions, but as civil war gripped the country, oil fields were often the object of contention
and under fire by rebel causes. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize the
subsequent Huerta government, sent marines to occupy Veracrdz after an incident involving the
arrest of U.S. sailors. Unable to deploy troops to counteract the American invasion and the
rebellion, Huerta left the country in August, 1914. See MANCKE, supra note 20, at 32, 34;
SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 21, at 29.
36. Article 123 of the Constitution contained labor reform, most important the right to
organize, bargain and strike. See infra note 57.
37. Other land reform was in Article 127 which gave government power to redistribute land.
See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 21, at 229.
38. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 27, para. 4
(Mexico).
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the Constitution strictly requires the state to maintain a monopoly in oil. 39
Pursuant to the Constitution, Carranza enacted legislation that required
registration of foreign holdings with the government, which foreign
corporations saw as an attempt to force endorsement of the Constitutional
principle.'
The Constitution replaced outright oil ownership with concession
agreements. President Plutarco Calles enacted the first concession agreement
legislation in 1925, requiring companies to obtain new government
concessions for all land rights.4 ' By 1936, under President Lzaro Cdrde-
nas, the legislature approved a bill that gave the government the right to
expropriate.42 Not surprisingly, the oil companies viewed the Constitution
and subsequent statutes as a threat to their ownership and in many cases
outright refused to comply.43
But the closing act had already been written, and Cdrdenas clearly
supported labor against foreign oil magnates in order to remain in power."
A labor dispute led to expropriation in 1938. Exercising their right under
Article 123 of the Constitution, the STPRM organized a strike in early 1936
for higher wages, better conditions and increased fringe benefits.45 The
STPRM submitted the contract dispute to the Board of Conciliation and
39. A proposed alternative to the narrow interpretation is to treat oil as the government has
treated lands within the "prohibited zone" within certain distances of Mexico's borders and
seacoasts. Article 27 also prohibits alien ownership of "direct dominion" of lands and waters
within this "prohibited zone." But Mexico has circumvented the prohibition with legislation that
allows Mexican trustees to hold legal title in trust for the economic benefit of alien beneficiaries.
This trust system is the foundation for the maquiladora industry. The same system could be
developed for hydrocarbons, with PEMEX creating a subsidiary state corporation which would
act as trustee for foreign investors. See Edwell E. Murphy, Jr. The Dilemma of Hydrocarbon
Investment in Mexico's Accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 9 J. ENERGY
NATURAL RESOURCES L. 261, 270-71 (1991).
40. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6, at 28. Specifically, the executive decrees required
the government to grant drilling permits for any new wells (which were often refused) and that
petroleum land be registered with the federal government. New taxes were imposed on lands
held by leases prior to the May 1, 1917 Constitution. Id.
41. The Petroleum Law of 1925 required companies to obtain concessions for all rights,
derived from land on which oil production had begun prior to May 1, 1917 and all rights derived
from contracts entered into before May 1, 1917, by the surface owner or his agents with the
express intention of exploiting oil. The new concessions limited concession rights to 50 years.
Ley reglamentaria del articulo 27 constitutional en el ramo de petr6leo, in 5 PETROLERA: LEYES,
DECRETOS Y DISPOSICIONES ADMINITRATIVAS REFERENTES A LA INDUSTRIA DEL PETR6LEO 51
(1925).
Under an agreement with the U.S. ambassador, known as the Calles-Morrow Agreement,
Mexico eradicated the limitation. MANCKE, supra note 20, at 39.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6, at 30. The companies made two legal arguments
for their position. (1) Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution, provided that no law would have
a retroactive effect to the prejudice of any person. They argued that the concession requirements
imposed a new condition on previously granted property rights. (2) They argued that they owned
the subsoil, and thus had no concession to confirm. Id.
44. The corporatist structure Cdrdenas created that included labor is discussed infra Section
IB.
45. MANCKE, supra note 20, at 52.
7
Jensen: Chapapote: Interdependence and the Liberalization of the Oil Indu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
88 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
Arbitration, which held against the companies. The Mexican Supreme Court
upheld the decision. When the oil companies refused to comply with the
High Court's ruling, President Cdrdenas announced expropriation.'
Through expropriation, Mexico merely enforced its own internal law and
respected the highest tribunal of its laws. But nationalization was more than
an isolated demagogic act; it solidified the revolution by defining the
contours of a sovereign nation. To a progressive president, attempting to
define his nation following decades of bloody ambivalence, expropriation
represented national sovereignty.47  Mexico and not foreigners would
control Mexico's minerals in the land. Cirdenas' raspy voice delivered what
later was dubbed "the Declaration of Mexico's Economic Independence":
It is the sovereignty of the nation which is thwarted through the maneuvers
of foreign capitalists who, forgetting that they have formed themselves into
Mexican companies, now attempt to elude the mandates and avoid the
obligations placed upon them by the authorities of this country."
Profit from the oil would be directed to the state. The state created a
separate entity, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), and has accounted its income
separately. The government increased its taxes on PEMEX as its income
increased in the 1970's. By the mid-eighties, PEMEX provided 40% of
46. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6, at 29.
47. GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL, supra note 1, at 15.
48. Id. The Decree of Expropriation read:
Article 1-The machinery, plants, oil pipes, refineries, storage tanks,
communication ways, tank cars, distribution stations, sea carriers, and all other
movable and immovable properties belonging to [list of all oil companies], are hereby
declared expropriated, for cause of public utility, vesting them in the Nation, in so
far as, in the opinion of the Department of the national Economy, it may be
necessary, for the discovery, extraction, storage, refining and distribution of the
products of the petroleum industry.
Article 2-The department of the National Economy and the Department of
the Treasury intervening therein as administrator of the properties of the National
Economy, it may be necessary, for the discovery, extraction, storage, refining and
distribution of the products of the petroleum industry.
Article 3-The Department of the Treasury shall pay the corresponding
indemnification for the expropriated companies, as provided by Article 27 of the
Constitution and 10 and 20 of the Law of Expropriation, payment to be made in cash
and in a term not to exceed 10 years. The funds for effecting this payment shall be
appropriated by the Department of the Treasury from a percentage, to be hereafter
fixed, of the petroleum by-products produced by the expropriated properties, the
product of which shall be deposited, pending legal prosecution, with the Treasury of
the Federal Government.
Article 4-The representatives of the companies expropriated shall be notified
personally, and this degree shall be published in the Federal Diario Oficial to be in
force from the date of its publication.
Published in Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (ed.), DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS JANUARY, 1938-JUNE, 1939, 121-122.
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government tax revenue.49 Since PEMEX opened its first plant toward the
end of the 1950'sO, the government has determined how much to produce,
when to produce it, where to purchase supplies, taxing and training of
labor.5 The first regulations published in the Diario Oficial reserved all
primary petrochemicals to the state and formed a commission to recommend
who should receive permits to produce secondary petrochemicals.52
B. Oil and Labor
Oil represents more than an symbol of Mexican sovereignty but is
important for labor, a constituency now crucial to the controlling PRI's
coalition. Expropriation not only defined Mexico as sovereign, it partially
indicated who in society would be entitled to scarce resources. The PRI gave
unequivocal support to labor, something prior leaders had not always
done.53 Union and government interests coalesced, entrenching a relation-
ship that would be mutually supportive for the next four decades.
The PRI is organized according to corporatism, or functional representa-
tion, where all segments of society are represented in government by their
functions.54 The obligatory affiliation of state-sponsored rural, working
class, and military organizations sustained PRI dominance for the past four
decades.
Mexican labor acquired representation in the revolutionary process56
49. See LAURA RANDALL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEXICAN OIL 162, 166 (1989).
Between 1987 and 1991, PEMEX earned $36 billion and paid $33 to the government in taxes.
Id.
50. The first plant produced dodecil-benzene, a basic material for the manufacture of
detergents. Brnes de Castro & Christianson, The Petrochemical Industry in Mexico, in
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY AND PLANNING IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 88 (Sidney
Weintraub ed., 1986).
51. RANDALL, supra note 49, at 188.
52. Bi'nes de Castro & Christianson, supra note 50, at 88.
53. Calles, prior to Cdrdenas seemed to support factory workers more than labor interests.
MANCKE, supra note 20, at 52.
54. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 21, at 231. The strategy of corporatism is to mobilize
and organize the workers and the peasants, but to keep them apart from each other by creating
separate and competing sectors within the party. This way the government can control popular
movements and prevent a dangerous coalition to overthrow the government. Id.
55. Sidney Weintraub & N. Delal Baer, The Interplay Between Economic and Political
Opening: The Sequence in Mexico, 15 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Apr. 1992, at 187.
56. Francisco Zapata, Labor and Politics: The Mexican Paradox, in LABOR AUTONOMY AND
THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 173 (Edward Epstein ed., 1989). In 1912, labor achieved
identity through a revolutionary organization created called Casa del Obrero Mundial. This
organization became an active supporter of the Constitutionalist forces against General Huerta.
This support was formalized in 1915 with the signing of an agreement where the Casa
committed its support to the Constitutionalists in exchange for benefits for workers. In 1918,
labor leaders formed the Mexican Regional Workers Confederation, or Confederaci6n Regional
Obrera Mexicana [CROM] which explicitly linked labor objectives with state objectives. Id.
1993]
9
Jensen: Chapapote: Interdependence and the Liberalization of the Oil Indu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
90 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
and the 1917 Constitution57, but it was President Cdrdenas that formally
incorporated labor into the Mexican party apparatus through organized
unions. Cdrdenas created the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico
(CTM), or the Mexican Workers Confederation in 193611, successfully
uniting labor with state objectives. 9 Two years later, Cdrdenas officially
recognized as the official party the Partido de la Revoluci6n Mexicana
(PRM), formerly known as Partido National Revoluci6nario. ° Adhering
to corporatism, the PRM (later renamed the PRI) incorporated the CTM as
part of its governing apparatus.61 Under the umbrella of the CTM, the Oil
Worker's Union, the STPRM62, directly controls the 136,000 employees of
PEMEX.63
Through the vertical union structure, the PRI grants enormous political
and economic power to union bosses. In return, the union generates political
support for the PRI.
In the case of oil, PEMEX has delegated enormous power over
employment and contracts to the STPRM. The union contract' gives
control of more than 90 percent of PEMEX employment to the union.'
PEMEX management can legally appoint only 10 percent of the labor force,
57. The Constitution defines unions as "associations formed for the study, betterment, and
defense of the interests of workers and their employers." Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution
distinguishes two major types of unions: Section A refers to "industrial workers, agricultural day
laborers, domestic employees, artisans, and in general to all labor contracts. Section B discusses
public sector workers employed by the national government, states and municipalities. 5 types
are recognized: (1) germiales-same profession, (2) de enpresa-single company (3) indus-
triales-same industry (4) nacionales de industria-one or more companies located in two or
more states (5) oficious varios-those including less than 20 workers of the same profession but
located in the same municipality. The significance of the type is the specified bargaining
procedure. See Zapata, supra note 56, at 177-78.
58. Id. at 174.
59. CTM emerged from the CROM. See note 56. The CROM was very successful in
passing labor laws, including the Labor Code in 1931. Membership grew from 10,000 in 1918
to over 500,000 by 1926-27. The PRI gained enormous support through the institutionalization
of the CTM, solidifying the Revolution and prolonging the PRI's power. Id.
60. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 21, at 231.
61. The corporatist structure of the party is built around three functional groups: National
Peasant Confederation (agrarian), Workers Confederation of Mexico (labor), and the National
Confederation of Popular Organizations (popular) See id. at 231 and Zapata, supra note 56, at
179.
62. The STPRM resulted from a conglomerate of separate oil unions that united in 1935.
Prior to consolidation, each oil company had its own union. In 1935, 35 independent oil unions
existed. Sometimes the same facility had different union contracts. Wage and work condition
provisions varied significantly. The Cfrdenas administration called the first Grand Congress of
Petroleum Labor Organizations on August 15, 1935. Out of the Congress came the STPRM.
See GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL, supra note 1, at 84.
63. Pemex Sheds One-Third of Jobs in Past Four Years, ENERGY NEWS, September 17,
1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, ENERGY file.
64. The basic outlines of the oil worker's benefits are given in the 1959 labor contract
between STPRM and PEMEX. See RANDALL, supra note 49, at 107.
65. Id.
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and up to 5 percent of temporary workers' for new jobs.67 In many
cases, union control over employment has resulted in outright job-selling or
vendeplazas.68 Political elites turned a blind eye to jobs selling since
employment ensured more political loyals.69
To increase its influence over society, the STPRM relies on a large and
growing labor force. As a result, the union control over jobs contributes to
PEMEX over-staffing. In 1989, PEMEX listed 212,000 people on the
payroll.7 The labor force is very large in relation to production, prompting
some government officials to claim that PEMEX is 30 to 50 percent over-
staffed.7'
The union maintains influence over PEMEX's private contracting.
PEMEX can legally contract out oil operations under Article 36 of the labor
contract.' But the law requires contractors to use union labor in drilling
and give preference to union workers in construction.73 Contracting has
benefitted the union bosses both directly and indirectly. Directly, labor
leaders became contractors, and PEMEX has been willing to grant contracts
to union officials who controlled benefits and promotions of PEMEX
employees.74 Indirectly, PEMEX awarded contracts for political favors.
In 1981, PEMEX awarded 85 percent of its contracts directly to known
contractors rather than by public bidding.75
The STPRM has been able to use its power over employment and
contracts to integrate into nearly every town. In the past, the labor contract
required PEMEX to pay two percent of the value of the goods and services
66. According to the labor contract, if a job is not filled within 72 hours of a vacancy,
PEMEX can hire temporary workers for the next 75 days. If the union does not supply a
worker by the end of 75 days, the temporary worker gets the job. Temporary vacancies are
filled by moving a worker up the PEMEX ladder. PEMEX must allow a worker to learn the
job of a category immediately above his own job and must train the worker with pay to perform
the job to which he will be appointed. See RANDALL, supra note 49, at 108.
67. Id.
68. GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL, supra note 1, at 93.
69. Weintraub & Baer, supra note 55, at 7. Union bosses and politicians superficially
expressed desires to eradicate job sharing. Joaquin Hernandez Galicia, STPRM boss until his
arrest in 1988, called job-selling the "most serious problem bedeviling the union" and even
urged support for legislation to increase sentences for the offense. However, the proposals was
of little practical value, since few workers would be brave enough to prosecute when their job
was a stake. See GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL, supra note 1, at 94.
70. Jane Baird, Mexico's Oil Revolution, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 6, 1992, Bus. 1.
Compare with Venezuela which employed 52,000 in 1989 and produced the same volume of oil
as Mexico. Id.
71. RANDALL, supra note 49, at 12. Venezuela produces the same amount of oil as Mexico
with only one-fourth the number of workers. George W. Grayson, Look What Mexico's Doing
With Its Oil Monopoly, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 5, 1992, Outlook 1.
72. RANDALL, supra note 49, at 109.
73. Id. at 110.
74. Id. at 109.
75. Id. Salinas outlawed direct contracting in 1988. See infra note 176 and accompanying
text.
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contracted for to the STPRM, for "social services" in the countryside.76
The STPRM bosses have traditionally used this money to control local unions
in the countryside, trading social works for support of the STPRM. In 1984,
the Secretariat of Budget and Planning limited the use of contracts,
recognizing the abuse.77 Ironically, PEMEX simply loaned the money to
STPRM to maintain its programs in the wake of reduced contract income.78
PEMEX performs a dual role as the fifth largest international oil
company in the world and a social service provider. PEMEX provides its
employees with gymnasiums, symphonies, roads, health care and schools.79
They maintain modem aircraft for politician use.'
The end result of corporatism is the nurturing of clientelism within the
oil industry and society as a whole. The system forces individuals to support
the political and economic welfare of union bosses for employment and
benefits to the locale. The STPRM has taken advantage by integrating itself
into local areas through its social services to expand its support base.
Traditionally, support for the union has translated into support for the PRI
who has incorporated the union into its governing framework.
This pattern of mutual support is evident in Poza Rica, Veracrdiz. In this
oil town, the union owns all libraries, funeral homes and even park
benches." In return for its ability to buy up the whole town, union bosses
ensure crowds at political rallies. 82 Union contracts require members to
attend PRI gatherings or face sanctions."
C. Oil and Economic Development
Oil is not only important for labor, but large oil reserves provided much
of the needed confidence for the PRI to continually pursue a nationalistic
economic development strategy: to expand the public sector and reduce
dependence on foreign capital.' Large oil discoveries in the early 1970's,
coupled with the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) increase in world oil prices,' encouraged reliance on oil for
76. Id. Salinas eradicated the 2% union fee in 1992. See infra note 176 and accompanying
text.
77. Id. at 110.
78. Id.
79. Grayson, Look What Mexico's Doing With Its Oil Monopoly, supra note 71, at 1.
80. Id.




84. Arturo Carrillo, Comment, The New Mexican Revolution: Economic Reform and the
1989 Regulations of the Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of
Foreign Investment. 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 647, 655 (1991).
85. Changes in Mexican Tax Structure Reflect Need to Diversify Economy, NOTIMEX
MEXICAN NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 [1993], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol24/iss1/5
LIBERALIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN MEXICO
government income.86 More importantly, oil reserves evidenced to outside
investors that Mexico was a prime location for investment.8Y Mexico
financed heavy public sector spending with (1) oil exports8 and (2) loans.
Mexico encouraged foreign investment as a complement to domestic capital
growth as opposed to a control.89
Mexico pursued a plan of import substitution industrialization-a plan to
decrease reliance on foreign imports by building domestic industry as a
substitute.' An "Escheverrian Wall" under the President Lufs Escheverria
(1970-1976) brought protection in the early 1970's and hindered foreign
enterprise with state monopolies, compulsory joint ventures and weak
intellectual property rights. 9' President Escheverrfa restricted commerce in
goods with high tariffs and extended the requirement of prior import permits
to all products entering Mexico.' President Portillo (1976-1980) passed
exchange controls and expropriated the banks in 1982. 91
86. Id. Petrochemicals volume production increased 14 times between 1964 and 1983, or
at a 15 percent annual rate of growth. B.rnes de Castro & Christianson, supra note 50, at 88.
See chart at 89. Dynamic growth took place in the public sector, with basic petrochemicals
increasing 29 times, going from 245 thousand tons in 1964 to 5.15 million tons in 1983. The
number of the basic petrochemicals also increased from 11 to 23 between the years 1964 and
1983.
In the secondary sector, production increased 8.3 times between 1964 and 1983. The
average annual growth rate was 11.8 percent, increasing from 745 thousand tons in 1964 to 6.15
million tomes in 1983. The number of secondary products increased from 58 to 309. Id. See
charts at 89-97.
87. Carrillo, supra note 84, at 654.
88. A policy partially depending on oil exports, by definition necessitated a certain reliance
on the foreign importing countries. Mexico attempted to reduce that reliance through
diversification of its oil markets. In 1980, Mexico adopted a National Energy Plan which ruled,
first, that no single country could receive more than 50 percent of the Mexico's crude oil
exports. Second, no country could import Mexican crude more than 20 percent of its total
imports. Since the United States accounted for 80 percent of Mexico's crude oil exports
between the years of 1975 and 1980, the legislature intended to reduce dependence on the U.S.
Owen Saunders, The Mexico Factor in North American Free Trade: A Canadian Perspective, 9
JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 239, 243-44 (1991).
89. Id.
90. Osvaldo Sunkel defines import substitution in terms of the classes that are created by
substituting domestic industry for imported industry. It is "the formation of a manufacturing
sector, complete with its entrepreneurial class, professional and technical groups and industrial
proletariate, as well as the necessary and ancillary government and private financial, marketing
and educational agencies."
Dependency theorists argue that these newly created entrepreneurial classes in "the
periphery" have the same interests as entrepreneurs in "the center" (countries already
industrialized and able to exploit the periphery). The world becomes aligned according to
classes more and more rather than nation-states. This perpetuates the dependency status of the
Third World, as entrepreneurs have a financial interest in aligning themselves with large
Multinational Corporations (MNC's). See Osvaldo Sunkel, Big Business and Dependencia: A
Latin American View, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM,
GLOBALISM 477 (Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi, eds., 1987).
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Foreign investment policy has been consistent with administration
goals' of keeping foreign involvement as a complement to domestic capital
and growth.9" The 1973 Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and
for the Regulation of Foreign Investment (Foreign Investment Law or FIL)
codified the myriad of investment laws of previous administrations.' The
94. Mexico's regulations on foreign investment are often the result of administrative policy
rather than the legislative process, signifying that the executive has been able to define the extent
of foreign involvement in the Mexican economy. Since the executive has always been the head
of the ruling PRI, presidents have rarely moved to upset the coalition with labor by favoring
increased foreign investment.
The main source of executive power is the initiation of legislation. Congress rarely
does more than "rubber stamp" drafts by the executive. However, to be effective, the
legislation must be promulgated by the President and published in the Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n (Diaro Oficial).
Constitutionally, the president has the following powers, which reflect the enormous weight
the executive is given defining policy:
(1) Article 89 §1 permits the executive to enact general rules in the form of regulations,
which explain and supply detailed precepts for the application of specific laws. Though the
regulations cannot contradict the statute and are "subordinate," the publication and promulgation
is the same as statutes. The regulation is equivalent to a "decree." See note 150 for Supreme
Court interpretation of the regulation power.
(2) Congress has delegated to the president the authority to legislate directly in foreign
trade, establishing by executive decree tariffs and restrictions on imports and exports.
(3) Congress has delegated the power to issue "official communications," which are
instructions and application of laws. Though they are usually issued internally, they may take
the form of binding regulation.
(4) The Constitution also grants to the president "extraordinary legislative power," which
was amended in 1938 to read that "such authority to legislate could be granted only in
connection with a suspension of individual guarantees in times of grave national emergency
under Article 29 of the Constitution." This happened only one in 1944, when Mexico entered
World War H. Prior to the amendment, Congressional delegations were "so frequent throughout
the latter part of the nineteenth century and until the 1930s that there was often hardly even a
pretense of an independent legislative branch." See Sandra F. Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines
for Foreign Investment: The Selective Promotion of Necessary Industries, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L.
282, 283-85 (1986)
95. Some scholars assume the 1970s was the beginning of strict foreign investment
restrictions, as if foreign restrictions were the exception and not the rule. See Luis Rubio F.,
Changing Economic Structure of Mexico, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 13 (1987). However, the
dominant theme in Mexico since the Revolution of 1917, or at least since the oil expropriation
in 1938, has been to limit reliance on foreign markets.
It is true that sporadic efforts to improve the economy shifted the focus to allow more
foreign investment. For example, between 1940 and 1965 direct foreign investment quadrupled.
By 1969, it exceeded 2 billion dollars. But these increases were always accompanied with
pressure from labor for limits. The government retracted its policies, noting that the expansion
of foreign investment resulted in capital leaving the country and a growing trade deficit. See
Maviglia, supra note 92, at 281.
96. In World War II, considered a "grave national emergency," Congress granted the
President "extraordinary legislative power" pursuant to the Constitution. Under the Emergency
Decree of 1944, Congress delegated foreign investment control to the executive Ministry of
Foreign Relations. All decrees were later repealed except for the decree establishing the basis
for direct foreign investment quantitative restrictions, or limitations placed on the equity that a
foreign investor may have in a Mexican enterprise.
Concerns over foreign control during the war disrupting Mexican economy dominated the
Ministry's regulations. Mexico attracted a lot of foreign capital during the war. The Ministry
mostly feared that after the war, the capital would be withdrawn, damaging the economy. Thus,
they enacted regulations to prevent foreign monopolies, restrain the creation, modification and
liquidation of stock of Mexican companies. Though the Emergency Decree that established the
Ministry originally applied to specific activities during wartime, the Ministry expanded its own
14
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stated purpose of FIL was "to stimulate a just and balanced development and
consolidate the country's economic independence," '  but the underlying
desire was to lessen the foreign influence over the Mexican economy. 91
FIL limited foreign involvement especially in 2 ways: (1) It limited
control, stating that foreigners' participation in the administration of the
business enterprise could not exceed its participation in the capital. 99 The
participation in the capital was limited to 49 percent for most industries."0
(2) FIL established the National Foreign Investment Commission (FIC) 1
which exercised enormous powers in determining the amount of foreign
investment in certain industries.10 2
The policy of limiting foreign investment was successful in allowing for
limited domestic economic growth. Mexican GDP grew by more than 5
percent a year between 1930 and 1980.13 Even with the restrictions,
foreign investment actually grew. The lack of uniform investment laws
power.
By 1947, an Interministerial Committee coordinated investment, which included
representatives from the president and the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Relations,
Commerce and Industrial Promotion and Agriculture. The Committee merely followed policies
of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and its significance depended upon the President.
In the years up to 1970, administrations remained flexible toward foreign investment. The
government employed tactics to discourage foreign investment such as the promotion of joint
ventures, license denial for the acquisition of majority interests in Mexican companies. Certain
industries were outright excluded, including timber, telephones and mining. Foreign investment
would be allowed to further domestic interests. The government increasingly called for
"Mexicanization," where Mexican participation in a company would be increased, before
approving foreign investment. See Maviglia, supra note 92, at 285 for further discussion.
Gordon argues that little was added by the 1973 FIL. The motive for the law was to
prevent subversion of the "maze of rules" by foreign investors. Michael W. Gordon, The
Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth With Foreign Investment: Controlled But
Participatory Independence, 10 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1973).
97. Id.
98. Id. The Secretary of Industry and Commerce stated that FIL confirms the executive
policy of only approving foreign investment that builds the domestic producer and assures that
local companies dominate production and distribution. Id.
99. Id. Article 5 reads in part, "The participation of foreign investment in the administra-
tion of the business enterprise may not exceed its participation in capital." 7 February 1973,
D.O., 9 March 1973, printed in RALPH H. FOLSOM, ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL BusINESS
TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 752 (1991).
100. Under Article 5, minerals, secondary petrochemicals and automotive components are
limited to levels of 34 percent and 40 percent. Id.
"In cases where legal provisions or regulations do not specify a given percentage, foreign
investment may hold no more than 49 percent of the capital of business enterprises, provided
it is not empowered, by any title, to determine the management of the business enterprise." Id.
101. Maviglia, supra note 94, at 290.
102. Article 12 grants, among other power, the FIC power (I)"to decide ... the increase
or reduction of the percentage of the foreign investment participation in the country's different
geographical areas or economic activities, when there are no legislative provisions, or
regulations issued by the federal executive, that establish a given percentage or fix the conditions
under which such investment may be received and (I) to decide about percentages and
conditions in which foreign investment may be received in specific cases where, because of a
particular circumstances, they merit special treatment." FOLSOM, supra note 99, at 752.
103. Id. at 6. Because of high population growth, this translated into 2 percent a year on
a per capita basis. Maviglia, supra note 94, at 290.
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attracted foreign capital to those areas that remained open to such investment,
particularly manufacturing and industry."°  Even after the 1973 FIL,
foreign investment poured into Mexican industry. The unparalleled economic
growth, political stability and huge oil reserves made Mexico a prime
investment location. 105  However, investment confidence was with the
economic factors that Mexico could not ultimately control, such as oil
reserves and the global market for oil.
As long as looking inward led to high rates of economic growth,
inefficiency of production did not matter to politicians."6 Exports did not
increase, but protectionism kept out imports."7 Union bosses and produc-
ers benefitted from inward-looking policies, taking more rents without having
to improve quality of labor or production.
High-priced oil distorted incentives of the PRI, leading to a misallocation
of resources away from other areas such as agriculture toward oil. 08
Leaders chose a path of excessive public-sector spending based on an
inadequate tax base. They failed to develop a competitive industrial sector
to support economic growth.
Mexico embarked on a path of deficit spending, and the growth in oil
reserves in the 1970s allowed for excessive borrowing." 9 By the end of
the decade, the debt exceeded $100 billion, half of the country's GNP. 10
Even the growing petrochemical industry was deficit prone during the 1970's
and 80's.'1 I Domestic supply fell behind demand, so that Mexico imported
oil. Though exports increased, imports grew faster, increasing the sector's
deficit in 1983 to $158 million.12 Between 1964 and 1983 petrochemical
products represented 1.7 percent of Mexico's exports and 6.7 percent of all
imports. 3
104. Carrillo, supra note 84, at 652. More than two-thirds of all United States investment
in Mexico in 1950 to 1959 was in manufacturing-related activity, the percentage grew from
30% of all industries in 1950 to 50% of all industries in 1959. By 1967, U.S. investment
reached $890 million. Id.









108. RANDALL, supra note 49, at 188.
109. Weintraub & Baer, supra note 55, at 8.
110. Id.
111. BfIrnes de Castro & Christianson, supra note 50, at 98.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 112. Commonly, a raw material exporting country will become an importer of
the derivative products of its own raw materials which it cannot produce due capital
requirements. Trade imbalances result. Id.
[Vol. 24
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High GDP growth could only be sustained as long as high rates of
capital inflow continued." 4  In the early eighties, oil prices dropped
dramatically"', severely reducing Mexico's petrodollars." 6  Mexico
entered the worst recession of its modem history 7 and faced a foreign
debt that it could no longer pay."' The debt forced the government to
devalue its peso fostering capital flight." 9 Foreign investment capital fled
the country: from $3 billion in 1981 to $680 million in 1983." By 1982,
commercial banks suspended new lending' 2' that had financed the expand-
ing public sector and demand-led inflation of the 1970s.
III. INTERDEPENDENCE AND MEXICO
The oil shock and its global ramifications illustrates the inescapable
interdependent relationship that characterizes international relations."
Increased interactions between actors in the global system become too costly
114. Victor L. Urquidi, Constraints to Growth in the Developing World: Current Experience
in Latin America, 120 ISSJ 203, 206 (1989).
115. Oil prices decreased from $40 a barrel in 1981 to $25 in 1985. In 1986, oil prices
again dropped to below $10 a barrel. Since oil accounted for 60% of Mexico's foreign
exchange and over 30% of government revenue, the decline in the eighties has forced Mexico
to seek other means of foreign exchange. Rubio, Changing Economic Structure of Mexico,
supra note 95, at 15.
Some scholars believed oil prices dropped in the early eighties as a result of countries like
the United States reducing the influence of OPEC. The World Bank, largely controlled by the
U.S., financed oil exploration throughout the world at a time when demand was low. In turn,
prices dropped dramatically. Id.
116. Victor L. Urquidi describes what happened in all of Latin America, which is, in a
nutshell, the economic crisis that Mexico faced. "Cost-push and inertial inflation had arisen,
food prices had gone up in world markets, real interest rates on short-end and medium-term
borrowing form commercial banks had risen to as much as 15%. Domestic financial disorder
and mismanagement were rampant. Inflation had got out of hand. Currency overvaluation was
indulged in once again." Urquidi, supra note 114, at 206.
117. Luis Rubio, Mexico in Perspective: An Essay on Mexico's Economic Reform and the
Political Consequences, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 235, 235 (1991). Minimum wage reduced by
more than 50%. Population grew 2.5% per year between 1982 and 1988, contributing to a per
capita income decline. Other problems are discussed in Rubio, Changing Economic Structure
of Mexico, supra note 95, at 14.
118. Latin American debt reached $318 billion in 1981. See Urquidi, supra note 114, at
207.
119. Rubio, Changing Economic Structure of Mexico, supra note 95, at 14.
120. Carrillo, supra note 84, at 658.
121. Urquidi, supra note 114, at 207.
122. Interdependence means increased sensitivity to behaviors of other countries or their
actors. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Realism and Complex Interdependence, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM 379 (Paul R. Viotti
& Mark V. Kauppi eds., 1987). Interdependence is related to a broader change in the world
economy. Developed countries changed from an industrial society to an information and service
society. The developed world is now dedicated to creating, processing and disseminating
information and specialized services rather than only manufacturing goods. Thus, research and
development is geared toward technology generation in order for business to remain competitive.
International trade accelerated, requiring countries to compete on a global scale, and information
and services to be transferred to be globally transferred. See Castro & Christianson, supra note
50, at 83.
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to sever, including flows of money, goods, people, and messages.'2 Thus,
the interactions restrict a country's autonomy in its policy choices. The
world has become so interdependent that it is now impossible for a country
to act in an isolated manner in an autarchic national economy. 24 Rather,
each country is part of a global system"2 which transcends all frontiers and
ideologies.
123. In this sense, interdependence is distinguishable from interconnectedness. As Keohane
and Nye note,
Interconnectedness is not the same as interdependence. The effects of transactions
on interdependence will depend on the constraints or costs, associated with
them ... Where there is are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly
effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have
significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness.
Keohane & Nye, supra note 122, at 381.
124. Castro & Christianson, supra note 50, at 83.
125. For a better understanding of the concept of system see INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM AND GLOBALISM 211 (Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi eds.,
1987). See also JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. CONTENDING
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ch. 4 (1990).
Kenneth Waltz defines what is meant by a "systems approach" to studying international
relations. According to Waltz, each state in the system arrives at policies according to its own
internal processes, "but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as
by interactions with them." The system contains units (states) that interact in an international
structure. See Kenneth Waltz, Reductionist and Systemic Theories, in NEOREALISM AND ITS
CRrIcS 47, 54 (Robert 0. Keohane, ed., 1986).
Two main interpretations of the international structure have been offered. Kenneth Waltz,
a realist, defines the structure as anarchy. The international system, unlike domestic politics,
lacks at legitimate sovereign. States function similarly, by acting in their self-interest of
preservation. States are differentiated principally according to varied capabilities to carry out
this similar function of self-help. The varied capabilities, or balance of power, constrains state
behavior. In Waltz's view, national security interests are the paramount issues in international
relations, as each state is conscious of the varied capabilities within the system and seeks to
preserve or better its power. See Kenneth Waltz, Political Structures, in NEOREALISM AND ITS
CRrrcS 70 (Robert 0. Keohane, ed., 1986).
For Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, interdependence is the defining nature of the
international system. The international system is open to both external influences and effective
choice by actors within the system. Keohane and Nye see the need for a structural theory, but
emphasize factors not included in Waltz's conception of structure. Economic processes (such
as interdependence) and political institutions are important for defining the system. See Robert
Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 158 (Robert Keohane, ed., 1986).
Keohane and Nye argue that the world is best characterized not by anarchy but "complex
interdependence," which has three elements. (1) Multiple channels connect societies (informal
ties, telecommunications, governmental ties, etc.) (2) The agenda of interstate relationships
consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy and (3) military
force is not used when complex interdependence prevails. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 122,
at 379.
For Waltz's response to interdependence theory see Kenneth Waltz, The Myth of National
Interdependence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 205-23 (Charles P. Kindleberger, ed.).
For a broader discussion of the convergence of international relations theory and international
law see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
[Vol. 24
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A. Interdependent Relationship between United States and Mexico
For at least a decade, the United States and Mexico economies have been
interdependent. Mexico is the United States' third largest trading part-
ner. a2 Mexico exports 65% of their total exports to the U.S., amounting
to $45 billion, 27 and imports 68% of their total imports from the U.S."
United States exports in energy sectors 129 to Mexico was $670 million, 4%
of total energy exports. 130 U.S. imports in energy totaled $5.3 billion, or
10% of total U.S. imports in energy.' The internationalization of
manufacturing has literally occurred in the Maquiladoras, or "an off-shore
assembly operation involved in export-manufacturing processing or secondary
assemblage." 13 2
The United States involvement with Mexico's financial troubles is
inevitable as the debt crisis reveals. In 1982, Mexico owed the top 13 banks
$16.5 billion, or 48% of the bank's capital.' The United States had to
save its own banks from collapse with $2 million. "3
126. Alejandro Ogarrio & Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Mexico-United States Relations:
Economic Integration and Foreign Investment, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 223, 224 (1990).
127. Id.
128. Lawrence Kootnikoff, Coming Together, BUSINESS MEXICO, March, 1991, available
in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
129. "Energy Sectors" refer to petroleum and natural gas products, primary petrochemicals
and electrical energy. NAFTA Effects on Energy Sector Likely to be Limited, MEXICO TRADE
AND LAW REPORTER, May 1, 1993.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. A maquiladora exports raw materials and equipment to an assembly plant in Mexico,
which assembles or processes these materials. This operation works because of an interdepen-
dent relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. The laws of each country mutually support each
other. The finished-product is then re-imported into the United States for sale or production.
The U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (Section 9802.00.80 allows fabricated American
components to be shipped abroad and returned to the U.S. subject to customs duty limited to the
amount of the value added by the foreign assembly operations. Under U.S. Generalized System
of Tariff Preferences (GSP), products can enter the U.S. duty free if at least 35 % of the product
is of Mexican origin. In Mexico, The Decree for the Development and Operation of the
maquiladora Industry (December, 1989) is now the basic facilitating law. Under the Mexican
law, equipment, technology and components are imported into Mexico under bond without a
duty.
Labor on both sides is affected by the industry. Mexico benefits with training and
employment in economically depressed border areas. They are also major sources of foreign
investment earnings. The U.S. relies on cheap labor to remain competitive. Even though jobs
are exported to Mexico, many jobs are actually saved since otherwise the whole industry would
have to relocated overseas. For a complete description of Maquiladoras see An Investors'
Introduction to Mexico's Maquiladora Program, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 109 (1986), reprinted in
Folsom, supra note 99, at 344. See also Folsom, supra note 99, at 339.
133. Esther Wilson Hannon, A Review of 150 Years of US-Mexican Relations, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION REPORTS, Oct. 31, 1988, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
134. Id. Despite the crisis in 1982, U.S. banks found they could make more money through
lending than isolation. In 1992, not only did Mexico bring in the most foreign credits since the
debt crisis in 1982, the amount of debt contracted in Mexico is greater than at any other time
in its history. Luis Romo, Mexico Experiencing Biggest Wave of Foreign Credits Since 1982,
NOTIMEX MEXICO NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
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More than the banks suffered; the U.S. lost more than $300,000 export
jobs. "'35 United States policy toward Mexico in 1980's was partially to
keep Mexico from defaulting on its loans to U.S. banks, and to forestall
border security problems. 136
B. Shift in Economic Development Strategy
In response to economic interdependence, the PRI has shifted develop-
ment strategy from import-substitution growth to export diversification.
Correspondingly, the PRI has depended less on oil to finance domestic
growth. Altering decades of practice, Mexico has begun to open its
economy. '37
Beginning with Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Mexico gradually moved
away from import substitution industrialization by reducing import permit
requirements 3 ' and export promotion measures.' 39 Mexico took steps to
eliminate food-stuff subsidies, transport and energy subsidies."4°  The
government also sold a large number of public enterprises .14
In 1986, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), signaling a break with Cardenas isolation and embracing interde-
pendence. 42  The decision to join GATT signified that Mexico was
breaking with the 40-year development strategy of state intervention,
prioritization of the internal market and import-substitution industrializa-
tion. 43 In acceding to GATT, Mexico significantly liberalized trade by
replacing licenses with tariffs for all but 436 of its import items and reducing
Between July and September 29th, Mexico received $2.7 billion in loans. The transactions
included bonds issued by Teldfonos de Mexico and Nacional Finacieria. PEMEX issued $300
million in bonds guaranteed by their accounts receivable and another for $375 million guaranteed
by Banco de Comercio documents. $5.5 billion form capital markets entered private and public
markets. Id.
135. M. Delal Baer, North American Free Trade, 70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 132, 138 (Fall,
1991). Further, the recession sent droves across the border illegally. See Ogarrio & Castro,
supra note 126, at 225.
136. Baer, supra note 135, at 138.
137. Weintraub & Baer, supra note 55, at 9.
138. By 1987, 80% of imported products had no permit requirement. Id.
139. These measures consisted of tax rebates, credit facilities, relaxation of exchange
controls, and automatic approval of imports to be used in production for export. James W.
Conrow, Structural Reform and the Debt Strategy: The Mexican Case, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
21, 24 (1987).
140. Esperanza Duran, Mexico's 1986 Financial Rescue: Palliative or Cure, in THE
MEXICAN ECONOMY 96 (George Philip, ed., 1988).
141. Id.
142. In keeping with the Cardenas tradition, Mexico had long held that associations with
international organizations was a threat to national sovereignty. Thus, Mexico refused to join
the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries in the 1970s. JAMES M. CYPHER, STATE
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tariffs on over 4,000 import items.'" The key was export promotion. 45
President Salinas has decided to take advantage of global interdepen-
dence, freeing up trade to attract foreign investment for development. 146
Salinas acted immediately to lower import restrictions," and reform
foreign investment regulation. 4  The 1989 regulations 49 amended the
1973 FIL to permit 100% foreign ownership in about two thirds of the
economy without prior approval from the Ministry of Commerce or the
National Commission of Foreign Investment if certain conditions are
met. 150 A even more liberal investment law is expected by the end of
144. Much of the incentives for joining GATT was for credibility to receive loans. Mexico
received a World bank loan for $500 million. Conrow, supra note 139, at 24.
145. Ironically, export promotion, while embracing the pristine theory of the "free market,"
required aggressive state intervention. See CYPHER, supra note 142, at 182.
146. For a detailed but brief description of Salinas' reforms see Rubio, Mexico in
Perspective: An Essay on Mexico's Economic Reform and the Political Consequences, supra note
117.
147. With his 1988 reforms, tariffs were drastically lowered from levels as high as 200%
to a maximum level of 20%. The average tariff was 11%. Salinas also eliminated all permit
requirements. See Rubio, Mexico in Perspective: An Essay on Mexico's Economic Reform and
the Political Consequences, supra at 236. Agriculture and the automotive sector were excluded
from reforms. Weintraub & Baer, supra note 55, at 9.
148. As Sandra F. Maviglia Discusses at length, Salinas was not the first to attempt to
change the investment law. The FIC under its power to change percentage levels under the 1973
Regulations (see note 100), instituted Guidelines in 1984, which encouraged foreign investment.
Among other things, the Guidelines did not require "Mexicanization" within a specified time and
increased the percentage of foreign equity allowable. See Maviglia, supra note 94.
149. Regulamento de ia Ley para Promever law Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion
Extrajera, D.O. May 16, 1989; Unofficial translation published in VI Investment Laws of the
World (ICSID), Rel. 89-3 (Dec. 1989). The Federal Executive exercised authority granted in
Art 80 §1 of the Constitution and provided measures to assure compliance with the 1973 FIL
which had been approved by the legislature. But the Regulations of 1989 contradict the 1973
FIL, particularly in its 100% allowance and could be arguable unconstitutional. Article 89 §
1 of the Constitution only allows for a regulation to explain and supply a detailed description of
laws already approved by Congress.
The Supreme Court defined the scope of Presidential power in Tesis 404, Apendice al
Semanario Judicial de la Federaci6n, Tercera Parte 709 (Segunda Sala 1985).
Article 89, paragraph I of our Main Law, confers [upon] the President of the
Republic three capacities: a) That of promulgating the laws issued by the Congress
of the Union; b) That of executing said laws; and c) That of providing in the
administrative sphere its exact observance, i.e., the regulatory capacity. This last
capacity allows the Executive to issue general and abstract provisions, whose purpose
is the execution of the Law, developing and complementing [emphasis added] in detail
the provisions included in the legislation issued by the Congress of the Union...
The regulation] is an alternative norm that has its measure and justification in the law
... [T]he regulation provides the general and abstract media, that must be used to
apply the law to concrete cases.
Reprinted from Ignacio Gomez-Palacio, The New Regulation on Foreign Investment in Mexico:
A Difficult Task, 12 HouS. J. INT'L L. 253, 259 (1990).
150. Foreign Investment Regulations: Mexico, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Mar. 29, 1993.
The conditions are summarized in Ogarrio and Castro, supra note 126: (1) Investments in fixed
assets made during the pre-operational stage should not exceed the amount determined by the
Ministry of Commerce. (The Ministry review and adjusts this amount. Initially the amount was
250 billion pesos or 100 million dollars.) (2) Financial resources must come from abroad. This
21
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1993, where Mexico will bring its laws in compliance with its NAFTA
commitments.'5 ' The new law is designed to codify Mexico's free-market
policies and make investors even more confident in the changed attitude
toward foreign investment by ensuring that subsequent administrations will
not be as likely to reverse administrative regulations. 52
Mexico has decreased its reliance on oil to bring in foreign exchange
when oil sales could not longer finance the nations' growth.'53 When oil
prices fell, the Mexican government could no longer raise a high proportion
of its income from PEMEX. 54 Consequently, oil dropped in proportion
requirement is to ensure that scarce financial resources in Mexico are not depleted. (3) The
minimum amount of paid capital stock must equal at least 20% of the total investment in pre-
perational fixed assets. (4) Companies must located manufacturing facilities in zones other than
those with great industrial concentration. This requirement is to ensure that investment spreads
to the various parts of the country and also relieves the congested Mexico City. (5) Companies
must keep the accrued balance of foreign currency at least at a break-even point in the first three
years of operation. (6) "Appropriate technology" is required to ensure environmental protection.
151. Foreign Investment Regulation, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Mar. 29, 1993. The new
law is expected to do the following to liberalize the 1989 Regulations:
(1) Repeal foreign company performance requirements, such as the requirement that
foreign companies keep their foreign exchange flows in balance over a period of three
years.
(2) Eliminate most government approval requirements for investments.
(3) Simplify the classification of activities in which foreign participation is restricted.
The categories are as follows:
Classification Examples
reserved for the state petroleum
reserved for domestic retail sales of liquid gas, gasoline; non-cable
television, coastal maritime transportation
Foreign investment in 10%-49%
without prior approval national airlines, cable television, newspaper
publishing, basic telephone services
100% with official approval mining, oil and gas drilling, legal services
100% without official approval everything else
(4) End requirements or approval of plant expansions and relocations.
See Mexico Alert: New Foreign Investment Law, BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 23, 1992.
152. Though a significant stride toward allowing more investment in Mexico, the 1989
Regulations are only presidential decrees. Subsequent administrations might chose to enforce
the 1973 Law in a different manner. A codified law would enhance the credibility of Salinas'
intentions to alter the traditional Mexican investment scheme. See Juanita Darling, Mexico to
Make it Easier for Foreign Investor; Free Trade: The Proposed Legislation will Codify the Open
Policies of the Salinas Government and Give Legal Assurances to Outsiders, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1993, at D2.
153. In 1991, 70% of total imports represented non-oil sales; 55% were manufactured
goods. Anthony Fama, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Mexico: Heading in the Right
Direction, MEXICO TRADE AND LAW REPORTER, May 1, 1992 n. 12.
154. Changes in Mexican Tax Structure Reflect Need to Diversify Economy, supra note 85.
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total exports.'55 In order to raise the necessary foreign exchange, Mexico
diversified exports5 6 , reduced the size of its bureaucracy, 57 and increased
taxes on the private sector.5 8 With respect to oil, economic policy has
shifted focus: oil is no longer a commodity to prop up an internally-protected
market, but is itself one of many export commodities to compete in the
interdependent, global economy for foreign exchange.
C. Interdependence and Oil
In order to survive in an interdependent, global economy, Mexico has
been forced to alter the "revolutionary" oil policy that formed the very
legitimacy of the controlling PRI. To increase efficiency in a competitive
world market, Salinas has begun privatization and restructuring of PEMEX
and its union. Mexico is now hinting of allowing private and foreign
investment in all downstream activities of the oil sector.
Mexico has experimented with a greater private sector role in energy by
allowing domestic companies to purchase segments of the oil industry.
PEMEX allowed equity investment by domestic industry for the first time
beginning in August 1992, in selling some of its subsidiaries. The first
155. The following table shows the drastic decline of oil as a percentage of total exports
since the 1982 oil shocks.
TABLE 1. PETROLEUM EXPORTS 1982-1992












*From January to June
Adapted from Id.
156. Non-oil exports grew from $5.6 billion in 1982 to around $12 billion in 1987. Armen
Kouyoumdjian, The Miguel De La Madrid Sexeno: Major Reforms or Foundation for Disaster?,
in THE MEXICAN ECONOMY (George Philip ed., 1988).
157. Total financial resources consumed by the public sector fell from 11.7 percent of gross
domestic product in 1988 to 5.6 percent in 1989 and 3.5 percent in 1990. Id.
158. Increases in tributary income occurred after 1985, however, much of the increase came
from inflation. See Id. for exact figures. Increasing the tax base requires that Mexico embark
on a plan to foster industrial growth. This requires Mexico to allow more foreign investment
to develop the sagging industry. Id.
23
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divestiture was the highly profitable motor oil and lubricants subsidiary.'59
To lower operating costs, PEMEX has begun to sell assets under its
control. The company does not have enough funds to operate all of its
petrochemical plants."6 In 1992, PEMEX planned to sell 2.1 billion in
assets.' 16  To date, these have included "non priority areas" such as
painting and maintenance duties. 62 PEMEX plans to sell more of its oil
producing branch in 1993.
Joint ventures 63 with U.S. producers to refine Mexican crude oil are
increasingly common. Shell Oil Co. signed one agreement on August 25,
1992.16' Valero Energy of the U.S. and Dragados y Construcciones of
Spain agreed in September to operating a gasoline additive industry, which
was the first operation involving both private Mexican and foreign invest-
ment. 
65
The Mexican government has also "reclassified" basic petrochemical
products in order to reduce the number of products reserved for the state and
allow for more foreign investment. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution
vests control of all minerals, including "petroleum and all hydrocarbons,
solid, liquid and gaseous."'" But Mexico has distinguished between
"primary" petrochemicals, allowing no foreign equity investment and
"secondary" petrochemicals, which allow for up to 40% foreign invest-
ment. 67  If not on "the list," foreign investment is virtually unrestricted.
PEMEX has reduced the number reserved solely to the state since expropria-
tion, gradually allowing more foreign investment. In 1988, 70 petrochemi-
159. Juanita Darling, PEMEX to Let 51% of its Oil Unit Go Private: It Will Be the State-
Owned Petroleum Industry's First Such Divestiture, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1992, at D1. The
government took bids on the purchase of 51% interest in the subsidiary that sells motor oils and
lubricants. Id.
160. Mexico Said Studying Sale of Petrochemical Plants, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 1992, available
in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
161. PEMEX to Sell 2.1 Billion in Assets, NOTIMEX MEXICAN NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 17,
1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
162. Id.
163. Gordon argues that Mexico has used the joint venture as part of regulatory scheme to
control foreign investment. See Michael W. Gordon, The Joint Venture As an Institution For
Mexican Development: A Legislative History, 1978 ARiz. ST. L.J. 173, printed in FOLSOM, ET.
AL., supra note 99.
164. Shell will transport Mexican crude to Texas and refine it into unleaded gasoline to be
returned to Mexico. Michael Parrish & Juanita Darling, Mexico, Shell Form Deal To Run
Refinery, L.A TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at D2.
Under the agreement, PEMEX will acquire 50% of Shell's refinery in Deer Park Texas.
The PEMEX holdings will be secured in exchange for supplying Shell with Maya crude. Shell
will deliver 45,000 barrels of unleaded gas a day (20% of the refinery's crude processing
capacity). PEMEX-Shell Alliance, INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Sept. 9, 1992, available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
165. U.S. Firm Launches First Gas-Additive Joint Venture In Mexico, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
166. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 27., para. 4
(Mexico).
167. See Dale Kimball, Second and Tertiary Petroleum Operations in Mexico: new Foreign
Investment Opportunities, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 411 (1990).
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cals were under PEMEX's monopoly. 6 1 In September 1992, only 8
remained "primary."169
To restructure, Salinas has divided PEMEX into four "streamlined profit
centers," 170 based on the different functions of the oil industry.' 7' The
decentralization is part of a desire for greater efficiency without causing
domestic political problems in abandoning state's role in the industry. The
reforms impose accountability by illuminating the profits and losses of each
unit" and reduces the labor force by another 55,000.173 The director of
PEMEX, Francisco Rojas, works well with Salinas to encourage competition
and decentralization. 74
The drop in jobs has been disconcerting to many in STPRM, the union,
but Salinas has extended his reforms to the powerful constituency of labor.
Upon taking office in December 1988, he jailed the Union leader, Joaquin
Hernindez Galicia. 75  The new union leaders have agreed to eliminate
non-bid union contracts, an old way to court political support, and relinquish
the 2% payment on all union contracts. 76  Salinas has even proposed
restructuring the entire corporatist system, combining the peasant and trade
168. OGJ Newsletter, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Mar. 2, 1992, at 4.
169. PEMEX-Shell Alliance, supra note 164. The eight primary petrochemicals reserved
only for the state are: ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexade, heptane, raw material for
carbon black and naphtha. Some of the categories reclassified to permit full foreign participation
in September 1992 are: acetylene, ammonia, benzene, butadiene, butylenes, ethylene, methanol,
n-paraffins, ortoxylene, paraxylene, toluene and xylene.
A report in the Mexico City financial daily quoted unknown sources saying that the
government plans an eventual divestiture of all petrochemical operations and installations. Id.
170. H.F. Rice, NAFTA May Present Major Opportunities in Mexico's Offshore, OFFSHORE,
Sept. 1992, at 30.
171. Restructuring Proposed for Mexico's PEMEX, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, June 22, 1992,
at 34. The four subsidies are: (1) Exploration and Production, which manages all activities in
Mexico. (2) Refining, which will handle supply and marketing, operating PEMEX's 6 refineries,
distribution terminals and crude oil pipelines. (3) Gas and Basic Petrochemicals will manage
supply and marketing of LPG and natural gas. (4) "Secondary" will operation chemical units
not exclusively reserved to the state and market products to the private sector. (5) PEMEX
International, which has existed since 1989, will mange foreign holdings, crude exports, natural
gas and chemical activities.
Speculation circulates that PEMEX/Secondary might eventually be privatized. See
PEMEX-Shell Alliance, supra note 164.
172. GRAYSON, supra note 1, at 1.
173. Golden, supra note 11. PEMEX has shed one-third of its work force in the four years
between 1988-1992. The payroll dropped to 136,000 in July 1992 from 210,000 in 1987.
Temporary jobs were the most to go. See PEMEX Sheds One-Third of Jobs in Past Four Years,
supra note 63. The latest cut is part of Salinas' restructuring plan.
174. George W. Grayson, Incremental Change in PEMEX, 58 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Oct.
1991, at 10.
175. Galicia was sentenced four years later to 35 years for murder. He was widely
criticized for inflating payrolls during his tenure as Union chief. Pemex Sheds One-Third of
Jobs in Past Four Years, ENERGY NEWS, Sept. 17, 1992.
For a fascinating account of Galicia's rise and fall from power see Jack R. Deino, Rise and
Fall of PEMEX Union Leader Dominates Life in Oil Boomtowns, NOTIMEX MEXICAN NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
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union organizations into the territorial People's Movement (MPT). 177 The
goal is to reduce the clout of the bureaucrats and labor bosses in the powerful
unions, or those that have a vested interest in the status quo.
Proposals are now on the table to allow private and foreign investment
in "downstream" activities of oil production. 17  The change proposed is
a Constitutional conceptual change: PEMEX would have only exclusive
rights to the products extracted from the subsoil.179  After being sold, the
state owned company would give up exclusive rights conferred by the
Constitution. This conceptual shift comports with a broader reading of
Article 27 of the Constitution: that the state only retains "direct dominion"
over "petroleum and solid, liquid or gaseous hydorcarbons" in the
ground. 11o
Under the new law, private companies would be able to operate
refineries,"' produce many "primary petrochemicals" which have up until
the present been limited to PEMEX,1 u and import petroleum products
subject to a permit from the commerce secretary." a  Private companies
could operate their own pipelines and PEMEX would allow its existing
pipeline network for use by other companies."
Under the proposal, much of the regulatory, planning and permit power
is to be transferred from PEMEX to the Secretary of Energy, Mines and
State-Owned Industry (SEMIP).' PEMEX would become competitive,
which many analysts believe is necessary to revive the Mexican oil industry.
"What is missing from [PEMEX] is the concept of economic optimization.
PEMEX is an agency driven by volume goals, not profit goals."l"
Private service stations could import and distribute gasoline at the retail
level, but the stations would be owned exclusively by Mexican citizens."s
Thus, the Constitution is read to give exclusive rights to the state over
177. Ruling Party Shake-Up Undercuts Traditional Labor Bosses, NOTIMEX MEXICAN NEws
SERVICE, Aug. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.









185. Id. Industry analysts suggest that by transferring the permit power, Mexico is setting
up a framework to eventually allow private companies to explore, drill and produce crude, in
this sense, the ministry would act much like the U.S. Public Utilities Commission. Leaked
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Mexican hydorcarbons, but not over foreign hydorcarbons.'88 The Consti-
tution no longer is seen to bar the importation of foreign oil.
The reform, if passed as hinted, will take the form of "regulations"
decreed by the president without Congressional vote.'89 The regulations
would take a similar effect as the 1989 Regulations on Foreign Invest-
ment."9 This may worry investors, since the rules could easily be changed
by subsequent administrations.
Since the reform is challenging the very industry that is symbolic of
nationalism and labor, much of the momentum needed to enact it will depend
on subsequent events. First, the Salinas administration is concerned about
PRI prospects in the coming election' 91 and may not want to trample too
far away from its traditional constituency. Second, the North American Free
Trade Agreement is important to regulate and solidify an interdependent
relationship with the United States, and its failure may doom further oil
reform. 192
IV. NAFTA: A REGIME TO MANAGE INTERDEPENDENCE
The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' 93
structures the interdependent relationship between the United States, Mexico
and Canada. 1' NAFTA encourages private sector growth in Mexico by
188. Mexico's State-Controlled Oil & Gas Sector May Open Up, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA,
Aug. 23, 1993.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for a discussion of presidential power to set
forth decrees.
191. See Section V.
192. Draft Oil Legislation Awards Big Opening to Foreign Investment, LAGNIAPPE LETTER
Aug. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
193. For a summary see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, DESCRIPTION OF THE
PROPOSED NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.
194. Managing the interdependent relations may involve construction of sets of rules and
institutions-so-called regimes-to govern interactions in different issue areas. In the
international system, with the absence of central authority, the rules are voluntary, established
by states to provide some degree of order in international relations.
According to John Ruggie, an international regime is "a set of mutual expectations, rules
and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been
accepted by a group of states." A regime can be formal or informal. A formal regime results
from legislation or negotiation between countries or organizations. Such regimes possess dispute
resolution mechanisms.
International regimes create legitimacy for the international social order in much the same
way domestic structures legitimize domestic social order. In various regimes at the domestic
or international level, political authority is a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose.
Regimes, fulfill the social purpose by establishing norms, or standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations. To borrow a phrase from John Ruggie, international regimes
"internationalize" political authority. Regimes create norms, in the form of rights and
obligations, for the international system. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes,
Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION, Spring 1982, at 379. For a survey of regime theory see Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, supra note 125, at 167.
Rousseau described the phenomena of international relations as a "security dilemma"
1993]
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opening markets"g5 and liberalizing investment 96, but, at least rhetorical-
ly, leaves oil to state led development." 9 On the one hand, the NAFTA
reserves to the Mexican state "the right to perform exclusively, and to refuse
to permit establishment of investments in. . . petroleum, other hydrocarbons
and basic petrochemicals."' On the other hand, the NAFTA makes any
future retraction to isolationism costly by creating vested interests in society
in open markets and free flowing investment.' Coupled with recent
restructuring of the oil industry, the NAFTA increases foreign investment
opportunity in oil through its liberal foreign investment and government
procurement provisions.
A. General Market Access and Investment Provisions
Generally, the NAFTA encourages private-led development through
inherent in a system of anarchy, where states are independent but connected. He analogizes
international relations to a stag hunt, where hunters collaborate for the common good of hunting
the stag, but the possibility always exists that a single hunter might defect for a sure meal. The
risk of defection creates distrust within the system. States calculate short term gain, what
Rousseau deems "apparent interest," rather than "real interest" or the common good. For
Rousseau, the risk of defection renders international organization largely ineffective. Regime
theory focuses on when states co operate the hunt the stag.
A regime is a means for states to cooperate through establishing rules for behavior.
Grotius argued that governments often calculate self-interests in terms of long-range interest or
what he called the "international community interest." He argued that international law is a
restraint because it coincides with the interests of the state. Though idealistic to some, Grotius
argued that certain values and norms are shared across borders. Regimes, in focusing on
cooperation of states, is one way that these values diffuse national boundaries. Id.
195. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT [NAFTA], ch. 3 details market access
provisions.
196. Id., ch. 2 outlines investment procedures
197. Id., ch. 6, 7 Annex 602.3. See infra note 228.
198. Id., M-1 Annex III.
199. The NAFTA works to change norms of behavior. An example of how the NAFTA
operates to create norms of behavior that are hard to reverse is in the area of privatization.
Privatization in Mexico is a political process as well as economic. As Carla Hills reported at
the Capitol, the role of government as an owner and operator of business is being drastically
reduced in Mexico. Of the 1155 enterprises owned by the state in 1982, 801 were authorized
for divestment in 1990 and 619 were actually privatized. Examples include: the banks,
Aerom~xico and Mexicana Airlines, and Telmex. See Testimony of Ambassador Carla Hills,
United States Trade Representative, Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representative, June 14, 1990, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 583, 584 (1991),
Privatization threatens Mexico's society, such as formerly protected industry and displaced
labor, public managers and politicians who fear losing control. In order to institute a successful
privatization effort, the government must "market privatization." As Carlos E. Martinez states,
"Latin Americans have been taught that it is socially beneficial for the State to play a large role
in a country's economic activities. Advocates of privatization must challenge this principle."
See Carlos E. Martinez, Early Lessons of Latin American Privatization, 15 SUFFoLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 468, 478 (1992).
NAFTA plays a role in challenging the principle of state ownership. As system that
ensures opening of the Mexican economy, the private sector will continually grow. Day-to-day
decisions will be made by thousands of actors in the private sector rather than a centralized
bureaucracy. This growing public sector creates new vested interests in a liberal economy that
expects less from the government. See Weintraub & Baer, supra note 55, at 16.
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market access and foreign investment. The stated purpose of the agreement
is to eliminate trade barriers and increase investment.1°°
For manufactured goods, NAFTA assures open markets for exports."°
NAFTA incorporates the national treatment obligation of the GATT, Article
III ° , which states in part,
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any king in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.2 3
Once goods have been imported into one NAFTA country from another
NAFTA country, they cannot be subject to taxes or charges in excess of
those applied to domestic goods.'
NAFTA assures market access 5 by (1) eliminating tariffs' on
200. NAFTA, art. 102 states the Objectives of the proposed free trade agreement:
(1) The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles and
rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency are to:(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border movement of, goods
and services between the territories of the Parties.(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in their territories
(d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights in each Party's territory
(e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this
Agreement, and for its joint administration and resolution of disputes and
(f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation
to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
201. Viewing NAFTA from Mexico's perspective, Mexico guards against potential U.S.
protectionism. Mexico's manufactured good soared to 55% of all its exports in 1989, up from
14% in 1982. Baer, supra note 135, at 133. With 65% traded to the U.S., Mexico desired a
secure access to the market.
202. NAFTA, art. 301 says, in part: "GATT and its interpretative notes, or any equivalent
agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into and made a part of this
Agreement."
203. GATT, art. III, § 2.
204. Id. This applies to states and provinces within the NAFTA countries as well. NAFTA,
art. 301(2) provides:
The provisions of paragraph one regarding national treatment shall mean, with respect
to a province or state, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment
accorded by such province or state to any like, directly competitive or substitutable
goods, as the case may be, of the Party of which it forms a part.
205. NAFTA, ch. 3 details market access provisions.
206. Id., art. 302 states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, no Party may increase any existing
customs duty, or adopt any customs duty, on an originating good.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, each Party shall progressively
eliminate its customs duties on originating goods as set out in its schedule ...
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goods qualifying as North American under Rules of Origin2°7 (2) eliminat-
ing prohibitions and quantitative restrictions applied at the border, such as
quotas and import licenses 2"8 and (3) eliminating export taxes2°9 and
custom user fees.21 °
NAFTA also removes significant investment barriers. 21' The most
significant aspect of the NAFTA is investment, not trade.21 2 The 1980
trade openings made by Mexico make trade between the U.S. and Mexico
relatively open.21 3 What is not open between the two countries is invest-
ment.
214
Each country is to treat NAFTA investors and their investment no less
favorably than (1) its own investors national treatment and (2) investors of
other countries, most-favored-nation treatment.2 5 The minimum standard
of treatment is "in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security." 21 6
Under the NAFTA, countries may not impose performance require-
ments for investment (such as levels of exports and minimum domestic
content).217 The NAFTA provisions are more detailed than the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)18 or the GATT accord on trade-related
207. Specified in Id., ch. 4.
208. Id., art. 309 discusses import restrictions.
209. Id., art. 315. Under Article 604 Export taxes are allowable on energy products when
they are applied when destined for domestic consumption.
210. Id., art. 311.
211. Id., ch. 2 outlines investment procedures.
212. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Dilemmas of Hydrocarbon Investment in Mexico's Accession




215. NAFTA, art. 1102: National treatment
(1) Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other
disposition of investments.(2) Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another party treatment no
less favorable that it accords, in like circumstances, to investment of its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and
sale or other disposition of investments.
216. Id., art. 1105.
217. Id., art. 1106. "NAFTA allows for some non-trade related performance requirements
such as commitments to undertake worker training, construction or expansion facilities, and local
research and development." GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, NAFTA: AN
ASSESSMENT 80 (1993).
218. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 217, at 80. The FTA specifically bans all new
export performance, import substitution, and domestic-content requirements affecting U.S. or
Canadian investments while phasing out existing export and production based requirements. The
FTA allows the imposition of non-trade-related performance requirements such as employment
targets. NAFTA phases out over ten years export-performance, domestic content, domestic
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investment measures (TRIMS).219
Nor can a party impose on an investor "a requirement that a minimum
level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of the Party be held by its
nations. . ."I Under Article 1107, NAFTA forbids governments from
dictating the nationality of corporate senior managers.'22  However, Article
1107 makes an exception that parties can require a majority on the board of
directors be of a particular nationality.'m
To encourage investment, NAFTA protects investors from uncompensat-
ed expropriation and ensures freely transferable currency. A country may
not directly or indirectly expropriate investment of NAFTA investors except
for a public purpose.' Such purpose must be on a non-discriminatory
basis and in accordance with principles of due process of law. The
expropriating country must pay compensation to the investor without delay
at the fair market value of the expropriated investment, plus applicable
interest. 224  Investors can convert currency for earnings into foreign
currency at the market rate.'
B. NAFTA and Petroleum
While the private sector is opened with the liberal foreign investment
provisions, the public sector retains control of the oil industry. The first
article of Chapter Six on energy in the NAFTA provides: "The parties
confirm their full respect for their Constitutions. "I Thus, Mexico retains
the right to whatever control over its oil dictated by either a broad or narrow
interpretation of its Constitution. 7  The NAFTA does not rely solely on
Constitutional interpretation, but it states explicitly the reservation.'
sourcing, trade balancing, product mandating, and technology transfer requirements.
219. Id. The Uruguay Round produced a draft on trade related investment measures or
TRIMS. The coverage is much more limited than the NAFTA., covering domestic-content and
trade balancing requirements. Hufbauer and Schott contend that the NAFTA text provides a
useful model for future GATT accords and U.S. bilateral agreements. The NAFTA provisions
actually parallel the U.S. proposals at the Uruguay Round. Id.
220. NAFTA, art. 1102(4).
221. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 217, at 81.
222. NAFTA, art. 1107.
223. Id., art. 1110.
224. Summary, supra note 193.
225. NAFTA, art. 1109.
226. Id., art. 601(1).
227. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for the interpretations of Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution.
228. NAFTA, art. M-1, Annex III
The Mexican State reserves the right to perform exclusively, and to refuse to permit the
establishment of investments in, the following activities:
1. Petroleum, other Hydrocarbons and Basic Petrochemicals
a. Description of activities
1993]
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Currently, foreign equity investment is ruled out under NAFTA. 229
Restrictions specifically apply to what Mexico "classifies" as "basic petro-
chemical goods" reserved to the state.23 Article 602 locks in the recent
classification of certain petrochemicals as nonbasic. 2s Annex 602.3. l(b)(i-
v), in agreement with the general investment provisions, allows for unlimited
foreign investment in nonbasic petrochemicals. The effect of 602 and
602.3.1(b)(iv) if (and when) Mexico "reclassifies" petrochemicals is an
unresolved issue.
The NAFTA also flatly excludes risk contracts232 which give foreign
oil companies a percentage stake in oil fields they help develop.233
Generally, contracts with national oil companies can take 3 forms': (1)
pure service, which would contract to perform a specified service and allow
for no right to production (2) technical service, or providing technical
assistance in the exploration, development, production and refining of oil and
(3) risk service, where a company agrees to explore for potential with the
obligation to develop crude if discovered. When commercial production
commences, the company has a right to be paid, and the payment is often the
right to take the extracted oil at a discounted price. 35
The prohibition on risk contracts comports with the narrow view of Article
27 of the Constitution that restricts "concessions or contracts" and grants to
the Nation the exploitation of all hydrocarbons."
However, the treaty expressly allows for performance contracts.237
Also known as "turnkey contracts," performance contracts are service
contracts under which foreign companies do the drilling for a flat fee and
then turn the operation over to PEMEX 38 All the risk remains with the
contractor. The NAFTA requires prior approval if the investor establishes
(i) exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas; refining or
processing of crude oil and natural gas; and production or artificial gas, basic
petrochemicals and their feedstocks and pipelines; and,
(ii) foreign trade; transportation, storage and distribution up to and including first
hand sales of the following goods: crude oil, natural and artificial gas; goods obtained
from the refining or processing of crude oil and natural gas; and basic petrochemi-
cals.
(The same provision appears again in Chapter 6, 7 Annex 602.3)
229. Id.
230. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
231. NAFTA Effects on Energy Sector Likely to be limited, MEXICO TRADE AND LAW
REPORTER, May 1, 1993.
232. NAFTA, Annex I.
233. Michael Fitzpatrick, Mexico Opens Its Oil Industry A Crack To Neighbors, THE
REUTER BUSINESS REPORT, Aug. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXS Library.
234. See Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6.
235. Id.
236. Murphy, supra note 212, at 270.
237. NAFTA, Annex 602.3 provides, in pertinent part: The Parties shall allow state
enterprises to negotiate performance clauses in their service contracts.
238. Rice, supra note 170, at 30.
[Vol. 24
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more than 49 percent of the ownership interest of an enterprise involved in
"non-risk sharing" contracts. 239
Turnkey contracts are different from risk contracts, which require the
driller to assume the risk, but in so doing, the driller can receive an agreed
upon share of the supply discovered. Performance contracts are on the rise,
and have proven beneficial to PEMEX, allowing for more efficiency and
badly needed technology in exchange for a flat service fee.' In 1991,
Triton Marine Drilling Co. drilled a well in Campeche Sound cut costs
considerably, by finishing 123 days earlier than estimated PEMEX time.24 1
In keeping with the prohibition on risk contracts, Mexico has not granted
shares of oil for performance, but has offered bonuses for the amount of oil
foreign companies pump out of a field in performance contracts. 242
Bonuses supplement the flat fee during the performance of the obligation.
The main basis for bonuses is the speed with which the work is completed,
and whether a company strikes oil. u3 If performance contracts offer big
enough incentives, they could be indistinguishable from risk contracts. 2 4
Performance contracts may be undercut by the fact that they are entirely
within the discretion of PEMEX.245
The general investment provision that assures national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment is subject to two exceptions with regard to
energy. NAFTA requires Mexico (and Canada) to have government
approval for takeovers of existing businesses above specified monetary
thresholds.2' "Strategic activities" are reserved to Mexico, including the
following: exploration, exploitation, refining, foreign trade, transportation,
storage and distribution or oil and natural gas, basic petrochemicals,
239. NAFTA, Annex I, Reservations for Existing Measures and Liberalization Commitments
provides:
Prior approval of the Comision Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras is required for
investors of another Party and their investments to own, directly, or indirectly, more
than 49 percent of the ownership interests of an enterprise established or to be
established in Mexico involved in "non-risk-sharing" service contracts for the drilling
of petroleum and gas wells.
240. Id.
241. Oil's Role in Free Trade Crux of Mexico's Petroleum Sector Dilemma, OIL & GAS
JOURNAL Feb. 3, 1992, at 16. Triton received &20 million for its work, which is about half
what PEMEX usually pays for the same type of work.
242. Fitzpatrick, supra note 233. See Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 6, at 30.
243. Keith Bradsher, In Step Toward Freer Trade, Mexico to Pay Oil Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1992, at D1.
244. Bob Davis, Mexico Wins Demands in Trade Talks To Keep Full Control of Its Oil
Industry, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1992, at A3.
245. NAFTA Effects on Energy Sector Likely to Be Limited, supra note 231.
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pipelines, electricity and nuclear power. 247
NAFTA does include some concessions for oil in production of goods
and services.2' The treaty requires PEMEX to open 50 percent of its
purchases of goods and services to immediate foreign competition and 100
percent in 10 years. 9 Because PEMEX is a "government enterprise,"
NAFTA includes it in Chapter 10, Government Procurement. For Federal
government enterprises, the NAFTA applies to procurements of over
$250,000 for goods and services and over $8 million for construction
services.' A country also cannot discriminate against another country
supplier 15'
V. TENUOUS CORPORATISM
Increased liberalization has its benefits to Mexican society, furthering
development and efficiency. But these benefits come with political costs.
With a political structure incorporating the different factions of society into
the system252, the government is bound to fulfill its bargain and support the
factions of society. Increased foreign investment runs contrary to the
revolution that was highly about ridding foreigners from the society.
The result of the reforms has been to weaken the labor faction that has
been essential to the PRI corporatist structure. 53  Union leaders have
become increasingly unable to negotiate contracts that maintain workers'
standard of living or even that workers would be able to stay on the job. 54
Labor no longer has a strong influence in formulating pacts that include wage
controls.215
Workers have defected from the party unions. In March of 1990, 121
Mexican organizations joined to form a new trade union, the Confederaci6n
Revoluci6naria de Obreros y Campesinos, to challenge the state-controlled
CTM.56 An impetus behind the organization is the Partido de law Revolu-
247. Other non-energy-related activities are reserved to the state, including satellite
communications, telegraph services, postal services, railroads, currency issuance, and port and
airport control. See id. at n.5.
248. See NAFTA, ch. 10.
249. Id., Annex 1002.6, Mexico outlines a transition schedule. The obligations of the
chapter apply only to 50% of the total procurement in the first year (1994), and that reduces by
5% each year. In 2003, all procurements in PEMEX will be governed by the NAFTA.
250. See Id., art. 1002 for scope and coverage. In Annex 1002.4, Mexico excludes risk-
sharing contracts from these provisions. See supra note 203.
251. Id., art. 1004 outlines the National Treatment and Non-discrimination provisions.
252. See supra Section IB.
253. For an explanation of corporatism see supra Section IB.
254. Juanita Darling, Era of Limits for Mexico's Mighty Unions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990
at D-1.
255. Id.
256. CTM Challenged by New Federation, LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS: MEXICO
AND CENTRAL AMERICA, May 10, 1990, at 6.
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ci6n Democratica (PRD)" 7 , the opposition party that almost took the
presidency from the PRI in 1988.1
Ironically, the entrenched, authoritarian PRI has in the last decade
advocated enormous economic change. It is the challenge to the PRI that
fights for the status quo (at least economically)." Mexico's politics is a
scene where "apparent reformers are reactionaries and sitting incumbents are
revolutionaries. "260
Thus, the PRI walks a fine line between supporting its domestic
constituency and acknowledging global interdependence. In opening its
economy, the PRI undermines the very foundation of the revolution that it
is supposed to uphold. The fall of oil union leader Herndndez Galicia
foreshadows the larger picture of eroding corporatism in the PRI. One
month after taking office, Salinas and the infamous Union boss were pictured
in all the newspapers hugging-the traditional picture of politics as usual,
where the PRI courts the powerful unions. But less than one week later,
Salinas ordered 100 soldiers to Galicia's residence and had him arrested on
murder charges. The support seemed over. In Galacia's basement was a
huge arsenal. The power was also seized."'
VI. CONCLUSION
Oil is symbolically linked to the Mexican Revolution of 1917. Through
expropriation, Cardenas defined Mexico's independence from foreign control
and co-opted labor into the corporatist structure of the PRI governing
organization. These connections have made oil a very difficult industry for
the PRI to change.
Traditionally, Mexican political elites chose to protect the labor interest
and guard its national sentiment for oil. As expropriation illustrated, the PRI
has acted to isolate Mexico from foreign influence, protecting infant industry
257. Interestingly, the PRD is seeking to win support by some of the same corporatist
strategies that have been the bulwark of the PRI since Cdrdenas in the 1930s.
258. As Sidney Weintraub and Delal Baer note, discontent mounted in the presidential race
of 1988. The PRD candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cirdenas and son of former PRI hero President
Lzaro Cdrdenas, ran on a campaign that the PRI had betrayed the ideals of the revolution.
Cdrdenas engendered enormous support, particularly from the labor sector. The powerful oil
union boss Herndndez Galacia swung support for Cdrdenas breaking the long tradition of support
for the PRI outlined in Section I above. Salinas won officially with slightly more than 50% of
the vote, but many question the validity of the result.
The irony of the situation seems almost poetic: The son of the man who expropriated oil,
and was thus responsible for the ideals of the revolution, was able to capture the oil union boss
and thus much of the labor constituency on a platform of returning to the "revolution."
Weintraub & Baer, supra note 55, at 11.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Jack R. Deino, Rise and Fall of PEMEX Union Leader Dominates Life in Oil
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and labor by prioritizing internal markets. The PRI relied on its oil reserves
for economic development: oil was the primary export to bring in much
needed foreign exchange to finance heavy public sector spending. Oil
reserves also boosted the confidence of foreign investors in the Mexican
system, and allowed for excessive borrowing to finance public spending.
However, the foreign world that the PRI sought to be free of has instead
had a profound effect on the economy. Instead of being isolated from the
world, Mexico has become interdependent, sensitive to global economic
changes as the oil shock of the early 1980's revealed. As a result of the
collapse in the early 1980's, Mexico has embarked on a new economic
development strategy, encouraging foreign investment and privatization.
Though Mexico maintains sole ownership of oil, they have begun to
restructure PEMEX, privatize domestically, and allow for more foreign
involvement in procurements and joint ventures. Leaked proposals suggest
that the Salinas administration wants to go further and subject its monopoly
to foreign competition. Mexico's purpose is to increase efficiency in a global
economy.
Through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico
liberalizes foreign investment, and allows some concessions for oil in
production of goods and services sections. While "respecting the Mexican
Constitution," NAFTA liberalizes investment in oil when read in conjunction
with recent and proposed changes in Mexican oil policy.
Since oil symbolizes revolutionary ideals of the nation's sovereignty and
the preeminence of labor, structural changes of PEMEX and increased
foreign investment challenge the constituency of the revolutionary party. The
authoritarian PRI is now challenging the system that it set into motion in an
attempt to confront the realities of interdependence.
Kenneth D. Jensen*
* Special thanks to Professor Gloria Sandrino for numerous edits and assistance. Most of
all, thank you, Laurie, for your patience and understanding.
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